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Insufficient Investment,
Inadequate Services:
The Infrastructure Gap
in Latin America and the
Caribbean

Countries in Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) have
on average invested more than 3.5 percent of their annual GDP in infrastructure since 2008. This spending
peaked at 4.2 percent of GDP in 2013, falling to 3.5
percent in 2015 (Infralatam 2017). These high investment rates—twice the levels of the 1990s (Calderón
and Servén 2010; CAF 2013, 2014)—reflect government
decisions to alleviate bottlenecks and improve growth,
policies that allow private sector participation in the
infrastructure sector, and a favorable macroeconomic
environment.

an abstract concept, it comprehends the lack of physical assets, inadequate maintenance, and poor provision of infrastructure services in LAC, which explain the
perception that infrastructure services in the region are
of low quality. The World Economic Forum’s indicator
of infrastructure quality from the Global Competitiveness Report reveals that the quality of infrastructure in
LAC lags that of advanced economies and high-growth
Asian economies. Even more worrisome is the comparison with Sub-Saharan Africa, where quality indicators
may soon match or even surpass those of LAC (Serebrisky, et al. 2015). The trend in LAC is also of concern: In
12 out of 15 LAC countries, the index declined between
2011 and 2017 (by an average of 0.45), despite investments of 3.5 percent of GDP between 2008 and 2015.
These numbers are based on self-reported perceptions
of quality, not the objective quality of infrastructure. But
they provide a good proxy of reality.

Despite the increases, investment in infrastructure in
LAC remains low, averaging just 2.7 percent of GDP
between 1992 and 2015. By contrast, investment in infrastructure accounted for 8.5 percent of GDP in China;
5 percent in India and Japan; and 4 percent in other
industrial countries, such as Australia, Canada, and the
Republic of Korea (IDB 2016).

Low and
Declining Quality

Several studies estimate that LAC must invest about 5
percent of its GDP over the next 20–30 years to close
this gap (Perrotti and Sánchez 2011; CAF 2013; Serebrisky 2014). Such investment would be equivalent to an
additional $100 billion a year.

Low levels of investment in infrastructure have created
a significant infrastructure gap in LAC. This gap is not

LAC does not have the infrastructure it needs or deserves given its income level (Cerra et al., 2016). Intu-
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itively, one would expect a positive relationship between infrastructure quality and income level, because
when countries become richer, they can afford to invest
more in infrastructure—or because countries with better
infrastructure services tend to increase productivity and
hence economic growth (figure 1). The evidence shows
that most countries in LAC score lower on infrastructure
quality than one would predict given their level of income per capita. Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay,
and Venezuela show considerably lower than expected
infrastructure quality scores given their income levels. El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Panama demonstrate better
than predicted infrastructure quality.

The diagnosis is clear: LAC does not invest enough in infrastructure, and the quality of its infrastructure is lower
than it should be.

Infrastructure Quality Index (0 = worst, 7 = best)

Figure 2. Quality of infrastructure in six Latin American countries and their export market rivals, 2007 2015

Infrastructure Quality Index (0 = worst, 7 = best)

Figure 1. Relationship between quality of
infrastructure and per capita income
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Who is to blame for the low level of infrastructure investment—the public sector, the private sector, or both?
Policy reforms since the mid-1990s managed to increase
private sector investment from a negligible amount to 1
percent of GDP by 2015. But the public sector still accounts for more than two-thirds of total infrastructure
investment (figure 3).
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The lack of infrastructure services in LAC makes it difficult for the region to compete with the rest of the world.
Cerra et al. (2016) developed country-specific benchmarks for the region’s six largest economies (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru known
as LAC6), by identifying each country’s top five competitors for each of its top five export products. Based
on this measure, Chile is the only one of the six countries with infrastructure that competes with its trading
rivals—and even Chile lost competitiveness between
2007 and 2015 (figure 2).

Recent private investments in infrastructure have been
heterogeneous across LAC countries and sectors. They
represent a large share of total investment in some of
the smaller economies (Honduras, Nicaragua). In contrast, in the largest economies (Argentina, Mexico),
private investment as percentage of GDP remains low.
However, when private participation is measured in total US dollars invested, the largest economies account
for most of the total private investment in the region
(figure 4).

9

Increasing the efficiency of public
infrastructure delivery

Evidence-based potential efficiency gains in public infrastructure spending
in Latin America and the Caribbean

Figure 3. Average public and private investment in infrastructure as share of GDP
in selected countries, 2008–2015
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Figure 4. Share of total private investment in Latin
America and the Caribbean by country, 2008–2015
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More can be done to mobilize private investment in infrastructure, through a wide range of policies supported by multilateral development banks in the region.1
But even in the most optimistic scenarios, the public
sector is expected to remain the primary funding
source of infrastructure in the region.

The public sector is important not only because of its
large share of total investment but also because infrastructure investment has characteristics of a public
good, with strong externalities and network effects.
Electricity generation plants require an efficient transmission and distribution network to use their full capacity, and urban transport systems need trunk routes
and feeders to provide access to jobs and housing. If
infrastructure development is not adequately planned,
the efficiency of the services provided by infrastructure
assets will be limited. The public sector thus has an important role to play in planning infrastructure. In addition, global agreements like the Paris Accord and the
Sustainable Development Goals require governments
to plan better in order to develop infrastructure assets
that are resilient and can meet mitigation targets.

1 See “Principles of MDB’s Strategy for Crowding-In Private Sector Finance for
Growth and Sustainable Development,” May 2017 (https://library.pppknowledgelab.org/documents/4700).
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The Unpromising Outlook for
Infrastructure Spending and the
Need for Greater Efficiency
Both public and private investment in LAC has increased
in recent years. Can this trend continue? History suggests that the likely answer is no. Lower growth and more
difficult macroeconomic prospects in LAC (IDB 2016)
threaten to halt the recovery of public infrastructure
investment that started in 2005. In fact, it is likely that
public investment in infrastructure will suffer significant
cuts. Ardanaz and Izquierdo (2016) show that capital
expenditures are procyclical in Latin America, meaning
that they decline when growth slows. Carranza, Daude,
and Melguizo (2014) estimate that between 1987 and
1992—a period of financial and fiscal crises in LAC—
one-third of the improvement in fiscal accounts came at
the expense of lower investment in infrastructure.

A new narrative could focus on smarter rather than
more investment in infrastructure. Countries could focus on delivering the same quality and quantity of infrastructure services with fewer resources by increasing
the efficiency of infrastructure delivery. A study by the
McKinsey Global Institute (Dobbs et al. 2013) concludes
that advanced and developing economies could save
40 percent on infrastructure expenditure just by investing resources more efficiently. The figure of 40 percent
is a rough estimate averaged across infrastructure sectors and countries, but it highlights the size of potential
efficiency gains.
What would it mean for LAC to achieve efficiency gains
of 40 percent in infrastructure delivery? Based on the
average investment rates between 2008 and 2015,
total savings could reach about 1 percent of regional
GDP. However, there is no precise estimation for LAC.
How would LAC achieve these kinds of efficiency gains?
This report aims to answer this question by identifying
and quantifying sources of potential efficiency gains,
from planning and project selection to physical development to project implementation and maintenance.
This report further shows how the infrastructure gap in
LAC can be closed by making public spending in infrastructure more efficient.

At least after 1995, current expenditures grew almost
without interruption; capital expenditures were more
volatile (figure 5). Data confirms a bias against capital expenditures in LAC. Cavallo and Serebrisky (2016)
report that total expenditures in LAC in 2007–14 increased by 3.7 percent of GDP but that more than 90
percent of the increase corresponded to current expenditures; only 8 percent was devoted to longer-term
investments. These findings are bad news for infrastructure in the region.

Figure 5. Index of current and capital expenditure on infrastructure in Latin America and the Caribbean, 1995–2015
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Source: Ardanaz and Izquierdo (2016).
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Quantifying efficiency gains in infrastructure delivery
requires first estimating infrastructure needs (the demand side) and then estimating the potential savings
from meeting those demands (the supply side).
Assessment of demand is beyond the scope of this
report.2 It focuses instead on the supply side, using
the model of Dobbs et al. (2013) to identify through
a simple structure the components and processes of
the project cycle of infrastructure delivery that can be
improved to generate efficiency gains (figure 6). To
provide evidence on possible efficiency gains
in public investment in LAC, this report takes the same

² The most common approaches to measuring the infrastructure gap define the
infrastructure a country or region needs to (a) meet a target growth rate; (b)
achieve a specific objective, such as a coverage rate (for example, 100 percent
of access to water and sanitation); or (c) achieve an infrastructure stock
similar to a given country or group of countries. McKinsey (2016) estimates
global infrastructure investment needs of $57 trillion between 2010 and 2030.
LAC accounts for about 10 percent of that amount. For estimates of
infrastructure needs in LAC and other regions, see Calderón and Servén
(2003); CAF (2013, 2014); Fay and Yepes (2003); Kohli and Basil (2010);
Perrotti and Sánchez (2011); Bhattacharya, Romani, and Stern (2012); IDB
(2013); and World Bank (2017).
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3.

approach, producing qualitative and quantitative
evidence for potential productivity gains within each
of the components of infrastructure delivery in LAC:
project selection, delivery, and maintenance.
The McKinsey Global Institute (2016) estimates
that global infrastructure needs account for $3.3
trillion annually through 2030 in a business-asusual scenario. Productivity improvements could
reduce this amount by 40 percent. Potential gains fall
into three categories: improving project selection
and optimizing infrastructure portfolios (20 percent
of total gains), streamlining delivery (40 percent), and
making the most of existing assets (40 percent).

1.

Making the most of existing assets: Governments
should get the most benefit from their existing capacity by boosting asset utilization, optimizing
maintenance planning, and expanding the use of
demand management measures.

Improving project selection and optimizing infrastructure projects falls entirely in the realm of the public
sector. Streamlining delivery and making the most of
existing assets involve both the public and private sectors. The public sector is responsible for procurement
of public works and state-owned firms that provide infrastructure services, while the private sector plays a
role in cases where governments in the region allow
private participation in infrastructure, ranging from
management contracts to privatization. Regardless of
who builds or operates infrastructure, the public sector
plays a role in the performance of infrastructure service
providers, through economic and technical regulations.

Improving project selection and optimizing infrastructure portfolios: Governments must use precise
selection criteria to ensure that proposed projects
meet specific goals; develop sophisticated evaluation methods to determine costs and benefits; and
prioritize projects at a system level, using transparent, fact-based decision making.

This report provides evidence on possible efficiency
gains in public investment in LAC, highlighting some
of the principal opportunities for improvement at different stages of the delivery process. Further research
should assess whether and where public-private partnerships generate efficiency gains and allocate those
gains across the different components of infrastructure
delivery.

2. Streamlining delivery: Delivery can be made more
efficient by speeding approval processes, investing
heavily in the early stages of project planning and
design, and structuring contracts to encourage time
and cost savings. Contracts can lead to cost savings by, for example, encouraging the application
of lean manufacturing to construction or adopting
construction techniques such as prefabrication and
modularization.
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Improving Planning and
Project Selection
Infrastructure need,
business as usual

Improving project
selection and optimizing
infrastructure portfolios
Streamlining delivery
Making the most of
existing assets
Infrastructure need
after productivity
improvements
Source: Adapted from Dobbs et al. (2013).

Early-stage planning and design can be a key source
of savings, since avoiding changes after construction
has begun, reduces costs. One of the most powerful
ways to reduce the cost of infrastructure is to avoid
investing in projects that do not address clearly defined needs (“bridges to nowhere”) or deliver sufficient
benefits (McKinsey Global Institute 2017). “Investing in
the investment process” can raise returns on investment
while maintaining fiscal and debt sustainability (Collier 2008). Globally, choosing the right combination
of projects and eliminating wasteful ones could save
$200 billion a year (McKinsey Global Institute 2017).
When upstream planning is done properly, countries
can select the projects with the highest social rates of
return. In simple terms, proper planning, and project selection avoids “white elephants,” projects that should
never be undertaken.

SNIPs, their Spanish acronym). SNIPs regulate public
investment processes, guiding projects from the early
stages of formulation and feasibility to ex post evaluation. The hypothesis underlying the creation of SNIPs
is that better capacities to analyze and evaluate projects improve the quality and quantity of infrastructure
projects.

LAC has tried to improve project selection by creating national systems of public investment (known as

How well are LAC countries planning for infrastructure
and selecting projects? Sound evaluations of national

In 2010 a SNIP network was created to help strengthen
the functioning of these systems. The network, which is
supported by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), includes 16 countries
(Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay,
Peru, and Uruguay).

14

Increasing the efficiency of public
infrastructure delivery

Improving Planning and Project Selection

systems at four project stages: appraisal, selection, implementation, and evaluation. Its sample of 71 countries
includes 41 developing countries. Table 1 displays the
results for the 10 LAC countries in the sample.

Box 1. Components of the International
Monetary Fund’s Public Investment
Management Index (PIMI)
1.

The index—which ranges from 0 (least efficient) to 4
(most efficient)—indicates that countries in Europe and
Central Asia have the most developed public investment management processes (1.90 score on average).
At the bottom of the ranking is Sub-Saharan Africa (on
average below 1.50), where countries are weak in all
stages of the public investment management process.
Cross-country variations are wide, however. Indeed,
South Africa is the world’s top performer. The LAC average is 1.83; Brazil, Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia score
above the average.

Strategic Guidance and Project
Appraisal
• Nature of strategic guidance and availability of sector strategies
• Transparency of appraisal standards
• Observed conduct of ex ante appraisals
• Independent review of appraisals

2. Project Selection and Budgeting
• Existence of medium term planning
framework and its integration to the budget
• Inclusion in budget (or similar) for donor
funded projects
• Integration of recurrent and investment
expenditures in budget
• Nature of scrutiny and funding supplied
by legislature, including its committees
• Public access to key fiscal information
3.

The PIMI index includes only 10 of 26 LAC countries.
To overcome this limitation, the IDB developed a revised version of the IMF methodology and used it to
assess all countries in the SNIP network (Contreras et
al. 2016). This index includes a new dimension and two
subdimensions. The new dimension (“general characterization of the public investment cycle”) captures the
operational characteristics of the SNIPs that affect
all stages of the public investment cycle. The subdimension “methodologies on project preparation and
evaluation/social pricing” is included in the “strategic
guidance and project appraisal” dimension; the subdimension “selection criteria” is included in the “project
section” dimension.

Project Implementation
• Degree of open competition for award of
contracts
• Nature of any complaints mechanism relating to procurement
• Funding flows during budget execution
• Existence and effectiveness of internal
controls, such as commitment controls
• Effectiveness of system of internal audit

LAC countries seem to divide into four groups (figure
7). The bottom two groups, which are below the LAC
average, include Costa Rica, El Salvador, Panama,
Paraguay (the worst performers) and Guatemala,
Honduras, Nicaragua, and Uruguay (the second-worst
performers). Countries with good strategic planning
and evaluation usually rank better in terms of project
selection efficiency (correlation between these variables is 0.75).

4. Project Evaluation and Audit
• Degree to which ex-post evaluations are
conducted
• Degree to which external audits are produced on a timely basis and scrutinized
by the legislature
Source: Dabla-Norris et al. (2012).

systems of public investment are scarce. The International Monetary Fund developed an index—the Public Investment Management Index (PIMI)—to analyze
performance (box 1). It captures the institutional environment underpinning public investment management

3 The other dimensions of the index are project implementation, project evaluation
and audit, and general characterization of the public investment cycle.
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Table 1. Public Investment Management Index (PIMI) in selected countries, 2012
Appraisal Score

Selection Score

Management Score

Evaluation Score

Brazil

3.00

2.80

3.33

3.33

3.12

Colombia

4.00

2.80

2.13

3.33

3.07

Country

Total Score

Peru

2.83

3.60

2.67

1.33

2.61

Bolivia

2.83

2.00

2.93

2.00

2.44

El Salvador

0.83

1.60

3.33

1.33

1.77

Jamaica

1.83

2.40

1.33

1.33

1.72

Barbados

0.50

2.00

0.93

1.33

1.19

Trinidad and Tobago

0.00

2.40

1.33

0.67

1.10

Haiti

0.00

1.20

1.73

1.33

1.07

Belize

0.00

0.80

0.27

0.00

0.27

LAC average

1.58

2.16

2.00

1.60

1.83

Top performer worldwide*

4.00

4.00

2.80

3.33

3.53

World average

1.33

1.60

2.00

1.33

1.57

Source: Dabla-Norris et al. (2012).
Note: Values rang e from 0 (least efficient) to 4 (most efficient). Countries are ordered from most efficient to least efficient according to the Total Average Score
(a simple av erage of the four components of the inde x). * The worldwide t op performer is South Africa.

Figure 7. Inter-American Development Bank index of public investment management efficiency
in selected countries, 2015
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Note: Values rang e from 0 (least efficient) to 4 (most efficient).

Figure 8 presents the results for the strategic planning
and evaluation and project selection dimensions, the
most relevant dimensions to the plannin g phase of
infrastructure delivery 3. These scores are low ,
averaging just 1.9 on a 0–4 scale, or 47.5 percent of
the top score. The efficiency of project selection is 77.5
percent of the top score.
The results from Contreras et al. (2016) are
consistent with other efficiency-related public management indexes, such as the World Economic
Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index and the

World Bank’s Governance Index. One should expect
a positive correlation between the efficiency of
public investment management and competitiveness
and governance. In fact, the correlations between
the IMF and IDB indexes and those indexes are not
significant. Some countries with low PIMIs, such as
Costa Rica, Uruguay, and Panama, have good
competitiveness and governance rankings. These
results suggest that even good levels of competitiveness and governance do not guarant ee efficiency
of public in vestment management.

16

Increasing the efficiency of public
infrastructure delivery

Improving Planning and Project Selection

Figure 8. Inter-American Development Bank index of efficiency of strategic planning and evaluation and project
selection in selected countries, 2015
a. Strategic planning and evaluation

b. Project selection
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Low PIMI scores should be interpreted with care, as
they are based on subjective assessments. Still, they
strongly suggest the need for improvement in LAC. Furthermore, regarding project selection, the great value
of an improvement in the selection capacity is invisible:
bad projects are avoided, and those that remain are
the most necessary, that is, those with the highest social
rates of return.

Another way to evaluate the efficiency of public management of investment is to examine the private sector’s
perspective toward the public procurement cycle. Since
2015 the World Bank has been measuring how the private sector does business with governments by benchmarking public procurement4. It assesses procurement
life cycles in 180 economies, which it scores from 0
(worst) to 100 (best). Figure 9 shows this indicator for
LAC countries.

Figure 9. World Bank benchmark of needs assessment, call for tender, and bid preparation in
selected countries, 2017
100
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Source: World Bank (www.bpp.worldbank.org).

4 http://bpp.worldbank.org/
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cy development—including better governance through
reduced corruption, improved regulatory quality via
enhanced rule of law, and simplified permit procedures
and land administration—has contributed to the strong
performance of emerging economies. Table 2 summarizes the results of the PIMI, the World Bank’s Benchmarking Public Procurement database, and Infra Compass.

In 2017 the world’s top performers were Russia (100),
Canada (98), and the United States (98). Top performers in LAC were Colombia, Mexico, Nicaragua, and
Peru (80). The LAC average was just 62. Counterintuitively, the correlation between the bid preparation dimension of the World Bank measure and PIMI efficiency
scores for LAC countries included in the sample is close
to zero.

The country grouping exercise in table 2 is based on
a qualitative assessment. The observed differences in
country ratings across indexes point to the need for
more robust and comparable data and methodologies.
The comparison of these indexes suggests that LAC
countries fall into four groups in terms of planning and
project selection:

To identify policies and practices that lead to sustainable and equitable infrastructure through efficient markets, better decision making, and delivery, the Global
Infrastructure Hub (2017) created InfraCompass, a
framework to help countries deliver infrastructure more
effectively, and to provide a better understanding of a
country’s infrastructure market. Figure 10 shows the results for the 49 analyzed countries, which together account for 90 percent of global GDP and 75 percent of
the world’s population.

•
•
•

Figure 10. Global quality of infrastructure delivery, by
country, 2017

•

Group 1 (very strong): Chile, Colombia, Mexico,
and Peru
Group 2 (strong): Bolivia, the Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, and Nicaragua
Group 3 (weak): Argentina, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, and Uruguay
Group 4 (very weak): El Salvador, Panama, and
Paraguay.

We exploit data from IDB’s Emerging and Sustainable
Cities (ESC) Program to estimate the potential efficiency gains at the city level that might result from better
planning and project selection. The program assesses a
city’s infrastructure investment needs based on various
urban planning scenarios. Input variables include assumptions about changes in the size of the population,
parameters on population densities, and construction
unit costs per infrastructure type. Outputs are the developed area and the associated infrastructure investment
needs. They are compared across three development
scenarios: trend, intermediate, and optimal. The trend
(or business-as-usual) scenario extrapolates observed
parameters from recent decades into the future. The
optimal (or “smart”) scenario assumes higher population densities and restriction of development in high-

N/A

Source: InfraCompass (http://infracompass.gihub.org/).

According to InfraCompass, emerging economies are
catching up with developed countries in terms of the
quality of their infrastructure; these countries have dominated the list of top improvers over the past decade.
Performance in infrastructure delivery is considerably
lower in LAC, where no country performs at the level of
advanced economies.5 The report finds that rapid poli-

5 Global Infrastructure Hub results are based on a compilation of 130 potential
metrics from different sources. See http://infracompass.gihub.org/static/data/
GIH_InfraCompass_Technical_Methodology.pdf.
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Table 2. Indicators of infrastructure delivery in selected countries, 2017
IMF Public Investment Management Index (PIMI)

World Bank
BPP database

Global Infrastructure Hub
InfraCompass

Overall
efficiency

Planning
evaluation

Project
selection

Preparation

Delivery

Planning

Argentina

2.66

1.60

2.90

70

Medium

Low

Bolivia

3.03

2.50

3.60

65

Low

Low

Chile

3.03

2.40

3.40

56

Medium

High

Colombia

2.66

2.60

3.60

80

Medium

High

Costa Rica

1.76

1.60

2.30

70

Low

Low

Dominican Republic

3.03

2.20

3.35

70

Low

Low

Ecuador

2.66

2.00

3.60

78

Low

Low

El Salvador

1.76

0.90

2.40

70

Low

Low

Guatemala

2.35

2.10

3.40

58

Low

Low

Honduras

2.35

2.25

3.60

54

Low

Low

Mexico

2.66

2.50

3.15

80

Medium

Very high

Nicaragua

2.35

2.15

3.75

80

Low

Low

Panama

1.76

0.50

2.20

78

Low

Low

Paraguay

1.76

0.80

2.90

70

Low

Low

Peru

3.03

2.7

3.6

80

Low

High

Uruguay

2.35

2.37

2.7

67

Medium

Low

Country

80

Note: Dark yellow = very strong; light yellow = strong; light blue = weak; dark blue = very weak.

risk or protected areas. The intermediate scenario lies
between the other two scenarios (results on it are not
presented in this report).

The sample consists of 28 urban areas in 16 LAC countries, ranging from small towns like Añelo, Argentina
to larger metropolises like Asunción, Paraguay. All of
these areas are growing very rapidly, both demographically and economically, typically above their
national averages.

The difference between the trend and optimal scenarios is attributed to better planning, which results from
regulations and policies such as appropriate land use
planning, zoning rules, and urban growth boundaries,
which tend to increase population density, reducing the
need for greenfield development. The analysis examines capital expenditures and greenfield developments
only; it does not examine operation expenditures or
brownfield development.

Figure 11 shows the potential annual savings for each
city, expressed as the difference between the trend and
optimal growth trajectories. Savings ranges between
0.79 percent a year of total infrastructure investment (in
Valdivia, Chile) to 4.74 percent a year (in Salta, Argentina). The average potential savings from better planning
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0
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Annualized potential savings (percent of total investment)

Figure 11. Estimated potential efficiency gains from better planning in selected cities

Source: Data from the Inter-American Development Bank’s Emerging and Sustainable Cities (ESC) Program.
Note: Figures show annualized savings achieved by developing along the optimal path rather than the trend path. ARG = Argentina, BOL = Bolivia, BRA = Brazil,
CHL = Chile, CRI = Costa Rica, COL = Colombia, DOM = Dominican Republic, ECU = Ecuador, HND = Honduras, JAM = Jamaica, MEX = Mexico, NIC = Nicaragua,
PAN = Panama, PER = Peru, PRY = Paraguay, VEN = Venezuela.

is about 2.2 percent of infrastructure investment a year.
Across all cities, the sector with the greatest potential
for annual efficiency ga ins th rough be tter pl anning is
transport (2.6 percent of total transport infrastructure
investment). It is followed by electricity (2.3 percent
of total investment) and water, wastewater, and solid
waste infrastructure (2.1 percent).

more sophisticated urban planning.

When aggregating the city-level data to the country-level, countries with better planning evaluation and
project selection indexes, on average, have lower potential for efficiency gains from planning (figure 13). The
countries with the highest return from better planning
are Argentina, Nicaragua, Panama, Bolivia, Ecuador,
Potential efficiency gains from better planning are neg- and Mexico, in order of importance.6 Savings from betatively correlated with the size of a city’s population, ter planning and project selection could reach up to 2.2
suggesting greater potential of planning improvements percent of annual infrastructure investment. Public inin smaller cities (figure 12). City size may matter for two vestment in LAC averaged 2.5 percent of GDP between
reasons. First, small cities often play a catalytic role in 2008 and 2015; 2.2 percent of this amount is equivalent
economic development (Roberts 2014) and therefore to 0.05 percent of regional GDP.7
tend to face higher economic and population growth
rates than larger cities; their appetite for new and bet6 The results at the country level should be interpreted with care, because
ter infrastructure services therefore tends to be higher. some countries include only one observation at the city level. Given the
Second, compared with larger and more developed idiosyncrasies of the cities in the sample, the results may not be representative.
cities, most small cities lack critical technical capacity 7 This estimate assumes that all savings come from public investment and that
same efficiency gains can be achieved in general investment and are
and know-how, which constrains them from engaging in the
not city-specific.

20

Increasing the efficiency of public
infrastructure delivery

Improving Planning and Project Selection

Annualized potential savings (percent of total investment)

Figure 12. Relationship between city size and efficiency gains from improved planning
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Source: Data from the Inter-American Development Bank’s Emerging and Sustainable Cities (ESC) Program.
Note: Bubble size reflects a cities' overall infrastructure investment need.

Figure 13. Relationship between planning evaluation and project selection indexes and potential efficiency gains

a. Planning evaluation index

b. Project selection index
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Source: Data from the Inter-American Development Bank’s Emerging and Sustainable Cities (ESC) Program.
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infrastructure portfolios

Streamlining delivery
Making the most of
existing assets
Infrastructure need
after productivity
improvements
Source: Adapted from Dobbs et al. (2013).

Streamlining the delivery of infrastructure accounts for
40 percent of the estimated total potential efficiency
gains that can be achieved in infrastructure delivery,
according to Dobbs et al. (2013). A variety of bottlenecks raises costs. Land acquisition processes, environmental permits, and resettlement agreements usually
lack institutional coordination and involve lengthy bureaucratic processes that delay project implementation. Failure to use advanced construction techniques,
the high incidence of informal labor, and weak incentives to implement lean supervision systems all increase
construction and operation costs. This section examines
potential gains from streamlining infrastructure delivery
from two sources: reducing cost overruns and delays in
construction.

Reducing cost overruns
Cost overruns are common in infrastructure (box 1). In
practical terms, cost overruns in an infrastructure project imply that the assets in the project could be built using fewer financial resources. There is a caveat though:
Cost overruns are not always necessarily bad, or the
result of inexperience, ineptitude, or corruption. Building infrastructure is a difficult endeavor and often cost
overruns are to be expected. Investment in infrastruc-

ture is large, lumpy and involves high construction risks,
mostly driven by the impossibility of anticipating contingencies. Complex geology, archeological remains, natural disasters, and physical and social constraints in urban areas are among some of the variables that cause
unavoidable cost overruns.8 Considering this caveat,
the existence of cost overruns is still a clear indicator
that efficiency gains can be obtained in infrastructure
spending. Globally, they average 28 percent of infrastructure investment (Flyvbjerg, Holm, and Buhl 2016).
Cost performance varies by subsector and project type
(Cantarelli, Flyvbjerg, and Buhl 2012). In the transport
sector, for example, cost overruns for road, rail, tunnels,
and bridges are significantly different (overruns are
highest for tunnel and bridge projects). Flyvbjerg (2016)
finds that dams have the largest cost overruns (almost
double their planned costs). Table 3 shows average
overruns by project type.

8 Further non-technical reasons for Cost overruns could stem from changes in
inflation and exchange rate. I.e. if over the life of a loan tenor the inflation in
the local country increases faster as in the origin country of the funds (e.g. US)
and/or the local currency appreciates, the project costs in USD terms increase.
If these changes were not anticipated, they can drive up costs significantly. Especially in the LAC context these macroeconomic considerations might have
played an important role in recent decades.
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Box 2. What causes cost overruns in infrastructure projects?
A vast body of literature documents the high level of cost overruns in infrastructure construction (Flyvbjerg, Holm, and
Buhl 2003, 2004; Flyvbjerg, 2007, 2016; Cantarelli et al. 2010). It posits four main reasons for overruns:
• Information is incomplete.
• Projects are complex, making it difficult to design complete contracts and commit to a schedule of payments.
• Competition and transparency in bidding processes are lacking.
• Agents are unrealistically optimistic, underestimating costs and times.
The development of infrastructure projects takes time. Combining this fact with incomplete information sets the scene
for cost overruns. First, contractors may have less incentive to minimize costs as projects are in more advanced stages because the threat of downsizing and removal is less credible as the project progresses (Arvan and Leite, 1990).
Second, the complexity of infrastructure projects makes designs often imperfect, and together with the impossibility
of complete contracts incentivize contractors to present lower costs for getting the contract, and then renegotiate a
higher price (hold-up).
The literature identifies four types of overruns: technical, economic, political, and sociological dimensions (Flyvbjerg
et al. 2003, 2004). Among the technical, we find forecast errors and risks, which in infrastructure projects are complex
and difficult to specify (and quantify). Economic grounds include principal - agent problems among the public
officials who assign the projects and the society that benefits (in principle) from them. The objectives of public agents
and societies differ. Thus, incentives are not always aligned so that the decision of public agents is the one that
maximizes social welfare. In third place, frequently competition between cities or regions leads to proposals that
present underestimated costs; with the aim to gain the possibility of developing the project in their territory and take
political advantage of it. Once the work is assigned to one city, reassigning it to another is costly, especially once
construction has begun. Finally, beyond the strategic reasons, there is an “appraisal optimism”. This means that agents
tend to think that the costs, the risks, and the execution time of the projects are smaller than the actual ones. There is a
bias toward overestimating one’s own capacity to carry out complex projects, which is reflected in underestimating
costs and risks, and overestimating the benefits associated with projects.

Box table 2.1. Causes and explanations for cost overruns in infrastructure projects
Type of overrun

Cause

Technical

• Forecasting errors, including price rises, poor project design, and incompleteness of
estimations
• Scope changes
• Uncertainty
• Inappropriate organizational structure
• Inadequate decision-making process
• Inadequate planning process

Economic

• Deliberate underestimation, because of lack of incentives, lack of resources, inefficient use of resources, lack of dedicated funding process, poor financing/contract
management, strategic behavior

Psychological

• Optimism bias among local officials
• Cognitive bias
• Cautious attitudes toward risk

Political

• Deliberate cost underestimation
• Manipulation of forecasts
• Private information

Source: Cantarelli et al. (2010)
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Table 3. Average cost overruns in infrastructure
projects worldwide, by project type (percent)
Type of infrastructure

tilateral development banks have lower cost overruns
than other projects, because these projects must meet
rigorous requirements and are usually subject to higher
quality standards for preparation, implementation, and
supervision than nationally funded projects. Cost overruns on these projects thus represent a lower-bound estimate of cost overruns.

Average cost overrun

Dams

96

Bus rapid transit

41

Rail

40

Tunnels

36

Power plants

36

Buildings

36

Bridges

32

Roads

24

Source: Flyvbjerg (2016).

The size of overruns varies across regions. Using a sample of 806 projects worldwide, Flyvbjerg (2016) shows
that LAC has higher average cost overruns (48 percent)
than the World average (28 percent) (table 4). According to Flyvbjerg and Sunstein (2016), cost overruns have
increased in LAC and decreased in Asia and Europe
(no statistically significant trends were evident in other
regions). Citing anecdotal evidence, Guasch, SuárezAlemán, and Trujillo (2016) shows that 75 percent of
infrastructure projects in LAC experience cost overruns
and 65 percent of projects have delays of 6–18 months.
Table 4. Average cost overruns in infrastructure
projects in Latin America and the Caribbean and
the world, by type of project (percent)
Project type

Latin America and the Caribbean

World

Dams

103

95

Rail

59

40

Power plants

36

36

Roads

53

23

Total

48

28

Projects financed by multilateral development banks
provide a unique opportunity to calculate and compare cost overrun data across countries and sectors.
Throughout the process of infrastructure delivery, multilateral development banks use standardized processes to generate estimated construction costs at the
planning phase, and have the mandate to report actual construction values at the end of the construction
phase. Some countries generate similar information, but
national reporting systems are heterogeneous and are
seldom used to evaluate infrastructure.
Surprisingly, little evidence is available on cost overruns
of multilateral development bank projects.9 To fill this
gap, we studied 84 infrastructure projects financed by
the IDB and 148 infrastructure projects financed by the
World Bank in the Latin America and the Caribbean region in 1996–2015.10 The sample includes 142 (48 IDB,
94 World Bank) road transport projects (new construction, maintenance, and rehabilitation); 73 (24 IDB, 49
World Bank) water and sanitation projects (treatment
plants, improvement and expansion of distribution networks); and 16 (11 IDB, 5 World Bank) energy projects
(transmission).
Some 82 percent of IDB projects suffered cost overruns
(figure 14). In 5 percent of cases, the country asked for

9 Awojobi and Jenkins (2015) seem to have published the only study of cost
overruns in infrastructure projects financed by MDBs. They find that hydroelectric dams financed by the World Bank had average cost overruns of 27 percent.

Source: Flyvbjerg (2016).

To complement the scarce evidence for LAC, we created a novel dataset on cost overruns on infrastructure
projects financed by multilateral development banks,
which funded 10–12 percent of total infrastructure investments in the region (more than 20 percent in smaller
economies) (Serebrisky, 2014). We adopted the working
hypothesis that infrastructure projects financed by mul-

10 The IDB sample is distributed as follows: 35 percent of projects were in Brazil, 7 percent in Colombia, 6 percent in Haiti, 6 percent in Peru, 6 percent in
Uruguay, and 5 percent in Bolivia. The remaining 35 percent of projects were
in Argentina, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, and Trinidad and Tobago. The World Bank sample is distributed as follows: 26 percent
of projects were in Brazil, 10 percent in Argentina, 7 percent in Colombia, 6 percent in Peru, 5 percent in Honduras, 4 percent in Haiti, and 4 percent in Mexico.
The remaining 29 percent of projects were in Belize, Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica,
the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Jamaica,
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, St. Lucia, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
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Figure 14. Cost overruns in a sample of infrastructure projects financed by the Inter-American
Development Bank, 1996–2015
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Source: Inter-American Development Bank Infrastructure Projects Database.
Note: Bars in yellow are complex projects.

Figure 15. Cost overruns in a sample of infrastructure projects in Latin America and the Caribbean financed by
the World Bank, 1985–2010
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Source: World Bank Infrastructure Projects Database.
Note: Bars in yellow are complex projects.

additional financing from the IDB; in the remaining 95
percent of cases, national counterparts assumed cost
overruns. Average cost overruns accounted for 22 percent of total costs of the projects; in four projects overruns more than doubled the project cost.
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About 53 percent of World Bank projects suffered cost
overruns (figure 15). In 20 percent of these cases, the
World Bank assumed cost overruns. Cost overruns accounted for 17 percent of total project costs; some outliers more than doubled the project cost.
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In addition to these results, the following analysis allows
us to understand whether there is a relationship between
cost overruns and project complexity, the specific infrastructure subsector, the country where the project takes
place, and time.
Following previous literature, it is interesting to analyze whether complex projects, such as tunnels, plants,
Table 5. Cost overruns in infrastructure projects
financed by the IDB and the World Bank, by subsector
(percent)
Item

Transport

Energy

Water and sanitation

IDB

23

16

19

World Bank

18

9

17

Average

33

21

28

World Bank

38

19

34

IDB

144

93

138

World Bank

191

47

174

Figure 16 presents time series data on cost overruns. It
shows no improvement over time. The data suggest there
has been no learning process, as a high concentration
of projects with huge cost overruns (above 60 percent)
occurred in recent years, particularly since 2002. There
also seems to be no relationship between the government effectiveness index and the average cost overrun
(figure 17).11
There is a potential to lower cost overruns by 26%. Since
public expenditure on infrastructure reaches 2.5% of
regional GDP, savings from diminishing regional cost
overruns in LAC to a “technical minimum” could reach
above 0.65% of regional GDP.

Standard deviation
IDB

or bridges, produce higher overruns. Projects
involving complex projects (shown in yellow in figures
13 and 14) do not appear to have had higher cost
overruns than other projects; cost overruns were
higher in some sectors, but the differences were not
statistically significant (table 6).

Maximum

Sources: Inter-American Development Bank and World Bank Infrastructure Projects Databases.

Figure 16. Cost overruns in a sample of infrastructure projects in Latin America and the Caribbean funded by the
Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank, 1996–2010
120
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Sources: Inter-American Development Bank and World Bank Infrastructure Projects Databases.

11 This index measures the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment
to its stated policies. The database includes 200 countries and territories over
the period 1996–2015. See
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home.
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Figure 17. Relationship between cost overruns on a sample of infrastructure projects in Latin America and the Caribbean financed by the Inter-American Development and the World Bank and the government effectiveness index
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Sources: Inter-American Development Bank and World Bank Infrastructure Projects Databases.
Note: Figures are based on averages for 1996–2015.

Reducing project implementation delays
Delays in project implementation immobilize physical
and financial capital and increase a project’s costs in a
variety of other ways: unit prices can increase, trained
staff can leave the project, and needs and priorities of
beneficiaries can change (Leurs 2005).
To analyze time delay data, we use project information
data from the IDB. The analysis identifies two sources
of time inefficiencies: (a) delays between the time the
bank approved the project and the borrowing government approved the project’s eligibility for financing and
(b) delays in the planned disbursement schedule that
required an extension of the original closing date of the
project.
The analysis is based on 317 IDB infrastructure projects
approved between 1997 and 2016.12 The unit of observation is annual project disbursements. The number of
observations is 2,152.13
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For IDB infrastructure projects approved between 1997
and 2016, 17 months elapsed on average between approval and eligibility. 14 The number declined over time,
falling from 16 months. For the projects in the sample,
figure 18 shows the total time required to declare a loan
eligible since its approval sorted by year. The trend
shows a negative slope which illustrates that the eligibility process has decreased over time. Thus, for example, in 2005, the time between the approval of the loan
and the eligibility date was 16 months on average, but
by 2015 this time had decreased to 7 months.
12 The dataset started with 407 projects but was reduced to 317 projects after
scrubbing the data for missing values and inconsistencies. The average disbursement observation was $97 million.the period 1996–2015. See
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home.
13 We considered only investment projects. Emergency loans, policy-based
loans, and other lending instruments were not included because they do not
usually finance public works and because disbursements of these loans are handled differently.
14 Implementation of an investment loan approved by a multilateral development bank can begin only after the authorities of the borrowing country (usually
the executive and/or legislative branches of government) declare the loan eligible. For a detailed explanation of the IDB project cycle, see http://www.iadb.
org/en/projects/project-cycle,1243.html.
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Figure 18. Average delay between approval of a sample of Inter-American Development Bank projects and
granting of eligibility by year, 2005-2015
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Figure 19. Average delay between approval of a sample of Inter-American Development Bank projects and
granting of eligibility by recipient countries in selected
subregions, 2005 versus 2015

Figure 20. Average delay between approval of a sample of Inter-American Development Bank projects and
granting of eligibility by recipient countries in selected
subregions, 2005-2015
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first is the time between IDB approval of the loan and
the government’s signature of the loan agreement. The
second phase relies more on the beneficiary country:
the time between the signature and the enabling of all
necessary laws and rules in the country in order to be
able to start the implementation of loan components.
As mentioned, IDB infrastructure projects wait 16 months
on average between approval and eligibility. However,
60 percent of this time occurs between signature and
eligibility. Figure 20 shows differences in the average
delay in these two phases by country region. There are
regions where it takes more than a full year to enable
a project, such as Haiti and Central America, Mexico,
Panama, and the Dominican Republic, while others require less time.

Source: Inter-American Development Bank Infrastructure Projects Database.

Furthermore, the length of delays varies significantly
across countries (figure 21). It ranged from 4 months in
the Bahamas to 41 in Guatemala.

2015

Source: Inter-American Development Bank Infrastructure Projects Database.
Note: Data for the Caribbean and Haiti are for 2006.

Over time, the length of delays declined across all
subregions (figure 19). Haiti, Central America, Mexico,
Panama, and the Dominican Republic saw the greatest
improvement.
We can also identify two phases within the delays. The

There is a slight negative correlation between the length
of delays on the one hand and the World Bank’s government effectiveness index and rule of law indicators on
the other: Average delays are shorter in countries with
higher indexes (figure 22).
How do these time delays compare to international
standards? McKinsey Global Institute (2017) compares
the “dealing with construction permits” pillar of the
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Figure 21. Average delay between approval of a sample of Inter-American Development Bank projects and
granting of eligibility by selected countries, 2005-2015
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Figure 22. Relationship between length of delays in approving a sample of infrastructure projects financed by the
Inter-American Development Bank and rule of law and government effectiveness indexes
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ofoflaw
a. Rule
law

b. Government effectiveness index
100

100

90

90

Barbados

Barbados
Bahamas

Rule of law

70

Uruguay
Costa Rica

60
Trinidad
and Tobago

50

Panama
Brazil

Belice

40

Colombia
Peru

30

Bolivia

Jamaica
Mexico
Argentina
El Salvador

Ecuador
Honduras Paraguay
Guatemala

20
10

Bahamas

80
Government Efectiveness Index

80

70

Uruguay
Costa Rica

Trinidad
and Tobago

60

Mexico
Panama
Argentina
Brazil
El Salvador

Jamaica
Colombia

50
Belice

40

Peru
Bolivia

30

Honduras

Guatemala
Ecuador

20

Paraguay

10
Haiti

0

Haiti

0
0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

0

Average delay (months)

10

20

30

40

50

Average delay (months)

Sources: Inter-American Development Bank Infrastructure Projects Database and World Bank Government Effectiveness Index.
Note: Data is for 1996–2015.

29

60

70

80

Increasing the efficiency of public
infrastructure delivery

Streamlining Delivery

Figure 23. Global map of days required to complete all permitting and approval procedures for
infrastructure projects
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World Bank’s Doing Business report, which shows the
number of days it takes to complete all permitting and
approval procedures to build. Although this data is not
identical to the one previously analyzed in this section,
it is complementary given that it shows another source
of data that aims at documenting causes for project implementation delays. It finds that the process is shorter
in developed countries than in developing countries
(figure 23). Completing the process takes just 26 days
in the most efficient country (Singapore). It takes an average of 181 days in LAC, about a month longer than the
OECD countries’ average. Within LAC the least efficient
country is Barbados, where it takes 442 days to obtain
all permits and approvals. Barbados is an unusual case
because it also has the smallest number of procedures
(nine), meaning that it takes an average of almost
50 days per procedure (permitting costs are also the
least in Barbados—just 0.2 percent of total construction costs). In Venezuela, the second-worst performer,
it takes 434 days to obtain all permits and approvals;
it also has just nine procedures. Argentina takes the
third-longest time to complete all construction permits
(341 days and 21 procedures).

The shortest delays in LAC are in Colombia (73 days),
Haiti (80 days), and Honduras (89 days). Between
2009 and 2011, Colombia eased construction permitting by improving the electronic verification of prebuilding certificates, introducing regulations that categorize
building projects on the basis of risk, allowing electronic verification of certain documents, fully adopting the
“silence is consent” rule, and introducing a new unified
application form for building permits. Haiti processes
permits relatively rapidly, but at the highest price in the
region (14.9 percent of total construction costs).
Financial costs are direct and measurable consequences of delays in project implementation. Other costs include the loss of political credibility, the cost of delaying the benefits of the improved infrastructure, and the
opportunity cost of tying up funds. Time is valuable, and
the departure from the scheduled timetable of project
implementation creates opportunity costs in the form of
resources that could be allocated to alternative uses.
We measure the opportunity cost as the financial cost of
monetary resources that are not disbursed according to
the schedule set at the time of project preparation.
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Figure 24. Capital expenditure budget execution in
Peru, Guatemala, Paraguay, and Brazil, 2015
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The difference between budgetary allocations and actual capital expenditures is significant in LAC, ranging
from 23 to 53 percent (figure 24).15
Most of the evidence on the financial costs caused by
delays is anecdotal or based on case studies. In light
of the lack of actual information on disbursements, we
built a theoretical project disbursement curve, based on

information for the period 2003-2016 on programmed
disbursements in standard project documents, prepared for approval by IDB's board of directors. We
then compared the theoretical disbursement curve with
the actual disbursement curve, calculated using annual data on project disbursements (figure 25). The theoretical disbursement curve was constructed after reviewing more than 100 infrastructure project appraisal
documents, which contain detailed information on implementation schedules. The actual disbursement curve
was constructed based on actual disbursements of a
sample of 317 infrastructure projects. All disbursements
were standardized using their approval date as year 0
with disbursements followed on a yearly basis. Figure
25 shows the comparison between the theoretical and
actual disbursement infrastructure curves.
Both curves have an S-shape, which graphically depicts
how infrastructure projects behave. The start of the curve
is the moment zero, which is the approval year. At the beginning, the curve takes time as project implementation
begins. This period is the one between the approval and
the eligibility (government ratification or congressional
authorization), which lasts approximately two years.
Given that the curve is cumulative within time, once the
first disbursement is made, the curve increases in slope
because disbursements start and they accumulate, so
towards the end of the project, these accumulated disbursements make up the greater part of the project disbursements.

Figure 25. Theoretical and actual cumulative disbursements of a sample of infrastructure loans financed by the
Inter-American Development Bank, 2003–2016
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Source: Inter-American Development Bank Infrastructure Projects Database.
Note: Figures are based on loans approved in 2003–2016.

Actual

15 Execution could also be assessed by analyzing the procyclicality of the
capital and current expenditure at different points in the economic cycle.
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Figure 26. Theoretical and actual cumulative disbursements of a sample of infrastructure loans financed by the
Inter-American Development Bank in 2003–2007 and 2008–2016
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Source: Inter-American Development Bank Infrastructure Projects Database.
Note: Figures are based on loans approved in 2003–2016.

Figure 27. Theoretical and actual cumulative disbursements of a sample of infrastructure loans financed by the
Inter-American Development Bank, 2008–2016
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Note: Figures are based on loans approved in 2003–2016.

32

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Increasing the efficiency of public
infrastructure delivery

Streamlining Delivery

The gap between the theoretical and the actual curves is
significant. On the theoretical curve, almost 90 percent
of the loan is disbursed by the fifth year. In practice, only
30 percent is disbursed in this period, and the loan term
can extend up to 17 years.
This data can be analyzed from different perspectives.
First, we analyze the actual curve over the years to see
if, despite the delays, the IDB is improving the timeliness
of its disbursements. Figure 26 compares projects approved between 2003 and 2007 with projects approved
between 2008 and 2016. It finds that delays in disbursement decreased. The 2003–07 actual curve is farther
from the theoretical curve than the 2008–16 actual
curve, showing that there was improvement in disbursements. In seven years, 42 percent of the portfolio was
disbursed between 2003 and 2007. This figure rose to
66 percent in 2008 and 84 percent in 2016 (figure 26).
This shows a significant improvement over the past few
years, yet there is still room for improvement.16
Several variables could affect the disbursement trend,
including the size of the project, the infrastructure sub-

sector, and distinctive country characteristics. The
analysis suggests that there is no significant difference
across different project sizes, and they are all behind
the theoretical curve, as shown in panel a of figure 28.
However, we do see that large projects accelerate at
the end of the actual curve and finish before medium
and small projects. Furthermore, panel b of figure 28
shows that outlier projects (both large and small), have
the same disbursement behavior and remain behind the
theoretical curve.
Regarding infrastructure subsectors (water, transport
and energy), the analysis suggests that there is no significant difference between different subsectors, and
they are all behind the theoretical curve (figure 29).
Moreover, we have compared the disbursement curve
for other sectors, such as education and health. Figure
29 shows that the three sectors follow the same path
and are all behind the theoretical curve. However, infrastructure projects show a bigger gap from the theoretical curve than the other actual curves, showing that
social sectors may disburse more promptly, approximately between the third and tenth year.

Figure 28. Theoretical and actual cumulative disbursements of a sample of loans financed by the InterAmerican Development Bank, by project size and presence of outliers, 2003-2016
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Source: Inter-American Development Bank Infrastructure Projects Database.
Note: Figures are based on loans approved in 2003–2016.

16 Even without implementation delays, the actual curve accelerates at the beginning as the theoretical curve but it is still behind of it, suggesting that there is
room to improve while disbursement takes place.
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Figure 29. Theoretical and actual cumulative disbursements of a sample of loans financed by the InterAmerican Development Bank, by infrastructure subsector and sector, 2003-2016
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The actual curves are below the theoretical curves for
all countries in LAC. Disbursement appears to be slower
in Central America and the Caribbean than in Mexico
and South America (figure 30).
Several conclusions emerge from this analysis:
•
•
•
•

•
•

There is a gap between the theoretical and actual
disbursement curves.
Over time, the two curves narrowed, indicating that
disbursements improved.
Project size and subsector have no significant effect
on disbursements.
There is no significant difference regarding “outlier”
projects (i.e. particularly large or small ones), and
they are all behind the theoretical curve.
Infrastructure loans are disbursed slightly more
slowly than loans in education and health.
There is no significant difference in disbursements
across countries, although the gap between actual
and theoretical disbursements is larger in Central
America and the Caribbean than in Mexico and
South America.

But what does this gap between the theoretical and the
actual curve imply? All these delays represent serious

inefficiencies in disbursement that generate costs.There
is a value of money in time, and there is an opportunity
cost to delayed disbursements that could be invested
elsewhere. We have estimated the opportunity cost of
the money that was not disbursed as scheduled using
potential interest rates that could be earned on the
capital. Our results considered an average-size project
($100 million) and an average implementation period
(14 years) for different interest rates over the period of
analysis.17 Based on the average interest rate over the
period of analysis (4.2 percent), disbursement inefficiencies added 10.5 percent to project costs. Depending on the interest rate, these costs range from 2.8 percent (based on the lowest rate the IDB ever charged
since 1997 (0.99 percent) to 19.7 percent (based on the
highest rate charged (7.03 percent). This shows that
timely implementation can increase efficiency, and if
disbursements follow the stipulated schedule, savings
could account for up to 19.7 percent of the total amount
of the project. Since public expenditure on infrastructure reaches 2.5 percent of regional GDP, savings from
improved disbursements schedule could reach up to
0.49 percent of regional GDP.
17 By the 10th year, 96 percent of loans are disbursed; the remaining 4 percent
corresponds to closing related procedures.
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Figure 30. Theoretical and actual cumulative disbursements of a sample of loans financed by the Inter-American
Development Bank, by subregion, 2008–2016
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Many countries push for new infrastructure as the only
way to improve the delivery of infrastructure services or
to respond to increasing demand for services. Deteriorated roads and water and electricity losses indicate
that infrastructure assets are not providing quality service. The immediate policy answer tends to be construction of more infrastructure. But in many cases, more and
better services can be delivered at a much lower cost
by properly maintaining existing infrastructure.
Making the delivery of infrastructure services more efficient has been a key justification for promoting private
participation in the sector. LAC took the lead in allowing private sector participation in the provision of infrastructure services in the early 1990s. Since the first steps
(by Chile in the 1980s), the region has experienced a
wave of private sector participation— in transport, gas,
agriculture, public services, and other sectors (Estache,
Tovar, and Trujillo, 2004). In the 1990s, profits from private concessions reached 6 percent of GDP in 18 Latin
American countries (IDB 2002). Little evidence is available on the benefits of private sector participation.18
The main conclusion seems to be that there is plenty of
opportunity to improve the efficiency of infrastructure
services (Andres, Schwartz, and Guasch 2013). Accord-

ing to Dobbs et al. (2013), making the most of existing
assets can save around 40 percent in public spending
in infrastructure.
Are infrastructure services in LAC being provided efficiently? This is a complex question to address. Infrastructure encompasses different sectors and a wide
variety of assets that provide different services. Thus,
it is difficult to analyze efficiency in infrastructure as if
it were a single, homogenous sector or asset. Findings
differ across sectors.
The development of efficiency frontiers has made it
possible to assess the efficiency of certain transport

18 Guasch, Suárez-Alemán and Trujillo (2016) summarize studies dealing with
the pros and cons of private participation in the delivery of infrastructure services, citing Estache and Rossi (2010), Gassner et al. (2009), and Parker (2004),
among others. Using a representative sample of 220 electricity distribution
companies from 51 developing countries for 1985–2005, Estache and Rossi
(2010) find that private regulated companies were more efficient than stateowned regulated companies. Gassner et al. (2009) derive similar findings from
a sample of 1,200 utilities from 71 developed and transition economies. Parker’s
(2004) study of Great Britain finds that “without privatization, the introduction
of competition in some (network) activities would not have been possible at
all, or would have been difficult to promote […] increased competition and
better regulation are likely to be direct consequences of the privatization
process.”
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sectors in LAC (table 5).19 Serebrisky et al. (2016) find
that average technical efficiency of ports in LAC rose
from 52 percent in 1999 to 64 percent in 2009 (where
100 percent is perfectly efficient). Suárez-Alemán et al.
(2016) find that ports in LAC are much less efficient than
top-performing Chinese ports. They show that private
sector participation, the reduction of corruption in the
public sector, improvements in liner connectivity, and
the existence of multimodal links increase the level of
port efficiency in developing regions.
Based on information from more than 148 airports worldwide, Serebrisky (2012) concludes that LAC airports are
less efficient than airports in Asia and North America. In
the best-case scenario, only 6 of 22 LAC airports in the
sample were on the efficiency frontier. On average LAC
airports were 69 percent as efficient as the frontier.
Other infrastructure sectors, such as energy, water and
sanitation, are also far from the efficiency frontier. Es-

tache, Rossi, and Ruzzier (2004) provide estimates of
the efficiency of South America’s main distribution companies between 1994 and 2000. South America’s electricity sector could pursue an approach that relies on
performance rankings based on comparative efficiency measures. The authors show that based on modest
data publicly available at the moment, the mentioned
approach, could yield useful results.
Bonifaz and Barboza (2014) analyze urban water utilities in LAC. They find that private sector companies outperform public sector enterprises and that inefficiency
is positively correlated with firm size and the length of
a network. Inefficiency in the sector adds 32 percent to
costs, according to their estimates.
Analysis of levels of service constitutes an alternative
and supplementary perspective on infrastructure efficiency. The role of infrastructure in enhancing productivity becomes clear when the consequences of

Table 6. Results of selected studies on the efficiency of infrastructure in Latin America and the Caribbean 20

Study

Sector

Main result

Bonifaz and Barboza
(2014)

Water and
sewerage

Inefficiency increased costs 32 percent.

Estache, Rossi, and
Ruzzier (2004)

Electricity

Efficiency was 76 percent (where 100
percent represents perfect efficiency)
(regional average).

Serebrisky (2012)

Year

1999–2010

1994–2000

Airports

Efficiency was 69 percent (regional average).

Average 2005–06

Serebrisky et al.
(2016)

Ports

Efficiency was 64 percent (regional average).

Average 2000–10

Suárez-Alemán et al.
(2016)

Ports

In comparison across developing regions,
Efficiency in LAC was just 55 percent
(regional average).

Average 2000–10

19 Stochastic and parametric methodologies, such as stochastic frontier or data envelopment analyses, have been widely used. They involve the development
of a production or cost frontier, which represents the optimal combination of inputs in a certain industry. See Suárez-Alemán et al. (2016) for a description of
methodologies for estimating efficiency frontiers.
20 This table comprises a selection of recent analyses regarding the efficien-cy of infrastructure sectors in LAC. For a detailed review of infrastructure efficiency studies, see Worthington (2004) for water utilities, Schuschny (2004) for the electricity sector, or Estache, Perelman and Trujillo (2005) for the transport
sector.
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low-quality service provision are measured (Serebrisky
2014). For example, LAC loses 16 percent of total produced electricity—a much higher share than the 6 percent lost in OECD countries (Jimenez, Serebrisky, and
Mercado 2014). Losses from power outages in LAC
reached $68 billion in 2012, according to a World Bank
study (2012). In 2010, they represented 1.2 percent of
sales in LAC—more than 10 times the 0.1 percent lost in
OECD countries; losses were higher in Central America (equivalent to 1.5 percent of sales) and lower in the
Caribbean (equivalent to 0.5 percent of sales) (World
Bank 2010). Similar losses resulted from water shortages or interruptions in water supply. Losses from breakage or deterioration of merchandise during shipping
exceeded $70 billion in 2012.
In the transport sector, unpaved roads are associated
with low quality and inefficient transport services. Road
safety is receiving increasing attention as the direct consequence of inadequate services provided by infrastructure assets and poor regulation of traffic rules. LAC has
low transport infrastructure density given its income level: Its paved road density is similar to that of Africa and
about one quarter that of the next-lowest region (World
Bank 2017). As a result, road accidents are the leading
cause of death among people between 15 and 29. More
than 100,000 people a year die in road accidents in
LAC, and poor roads are estimated to cost the region an
estimated 1–3 percent of GDP (Serebrisky 2014).
Poor transport infrastructure also reduces the region’s
competitiveness. On the World Bank’s Logistic Performance Indicators, LAC ranks close to Sub-Saharan
Africa. Its costs more and takes longer to export from
LAC than from East Asia, and exporting costs are higher than they are in South Asia. Infrastructure challenges are enormous in LAC, where 106 million people lack
adequate sanitation, 34 million people lack drinking
water, and 30 million people lack access to electricity
(Serebrisky, 2014).
The International Monetary Fund’s Public Investment
Efficiency indicator (PIE-X) estimates the relationship between the public capital stock and indicators
of the accessibility and quality of infrastructure assets
(IMF 2015). It uses data envelopment analysis (DEA) to
develop the efficiency frontier.21 Countries are given
scores based on their distance to the frontier relative
to peer best performers; the less efficient the country,

the greater the distance from the frontier and the lower
its PIE-X score. Inputs are the public capital stock and
income per capita; output is a physical indicator of
the coverage of infrastructure networks that combines
data on the volume of economic infrastructure (length
of road network, electricity production, and access to
water) and data on the social infrastructure (the number of secondary teachers and hospital beds) and the
quality of infrastructure indicator from the World Economic Forum database.
This analysis reveals efficiency gaps of 40 percent for
low-income countries, 27 percent for emerging economies, and 13 percent of advanced economies. Although
these scores may be biased and the impact of quality
may be lost in the development of the frontier (all variability could be explained by the quantity indicators,
as the quality variable is truncated on a 1–7 scale), the
results give a sense of the low performance in the developing world.
The IMF study includes only three LAC countries (Bolivia, Brazil, and Chile). To fill this gap, we developed a
frontier with quality of infrastructure as the output and
public capital stock and income per capita as inputs.
Our analysis covers 126 countries, including 19 in LAC,
from 2007 to 2013.22 The results show that LAC performs
far worse than the world’s best performer (Switzerland),
although scores were higher in recent years than they
were in 2007–09 (figure 31).
Countries can make the most of existing assets by maintaining them properly. We often talk about the importance of infrastructure for growth and development
and keep stressing the importance of investing to expand infrastructure to meet population demands and
achieve competitiveness. However, once infrastructure
is built, we often take for granted that it will continue
to provide services at the level of quality observed immediately after construction is completed. The truth is
that infrastructure deteriorates over time. Depreciation
of infrastructure assets is non-linear, which is why most
21 DEA, developed by Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978), is the most frequently applied nonparametric methodology for estimating efficiency levels in infrastructure. The frontier is obtained by establishing relationships between outputs
and different input combinations through linear programming; the degree of
efficiency is measured by the distance between the observation and the best
practice frontier.
22 See appendix for the lists of countries.
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Figure 31. Infrastructure efficiency scores, 2007–13
a. Average infrastructure efficiency scores in
2007– 2013 of top performer (Switzerland)
and Latin America and the Caribbean
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on IMF public capital stock and WEF data.

of the time, the deterioration is often not visible
until the moment when routine maintenance can no
longer reverse the damage (box 3). When
maintenance is no longer an option, much more
expensive rehabilitation or rebuilding is required.
Lack of proper maintenance increases costs to the
provider of the infrastructure. It also imposes
operational costs on infrastructure users. In the case of
roads, for example, deteriorated infrastructure is
associated with vehicle depreciation, increased travel
times, higher gas consumption, and more accidents. In
the case of electricity, lack of maintenance increases
electricity losses, power tripping, system instability,
breakdowns,
and
fires. Poorly
maintained
infrastructure also sometimes causes firms to invest
in infrastructure themselves (buying generators,
for example) (Rioja 2016).
There are several reasons for the bias against
mainte-nance. They include limited resources; poor
execution capacity; and corruption, favoritism, and
rent-seeking opportunities during the bidding process,
which create incentives to ignore maintenance.
Construction is more politically attractive than
maintenance, citizens place lower value on
maintenance projects, and the press focuses on new
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Box 3. The typical life cycle of a road
Depreciation of infrastructure assets occurs in a
non-linear way. For example, in the case of roads,
pavement deterioration begins slowly and accelerates over time. That is why most of the time, the
deterioration process is not visible until the moment
when maintenance or intervention cannot reverse
the damages. Then the infrastructure needs to be
rehabilitated or rebuilt, generating higher costs
than opportune maintenance. There are 4 stages
to the life cycle of a road when it is not properly
maintained.
New: The road has just been built and inaugurated. It is in excellent condition because it is brand
new. Slow and imperceptible deterioration: With
time, the road slowly starts to deteriorate without
being noticed, mainly in the paved surface. This
period lasts between 10 and 15 years depending
on the quality of the initial construction, traffic, and
climate events.
To stop the slow deterioration, routine maintenance
efforts must be done. Unfortunately, given that the

Making the Most of Existing Assets

gested before this time is because although it is useful, the opportunity cost of these resources is higher
and maintenance can still be put off a short time. The
critical phase is also the last moment before users
begin incurring additional operating costs. So, it is
the critical phase from their perspective as well.

Total loss: This stage means the complete deterioration of the road. This stage is very visible. Users can
perceive the fissures in the road, and vehicles start
experiencing damages when using the road. Unfortunately, at this moment there is no solution to save
the road and the only option is to reconstruct, which
is more expensive than preventive maintenance or rehabilitation.
As seen above, roads don’t depreciate in a linear
way, nor does maintenance correct the deterioration
in a linear way. There is a critical moment where intervention can save the road. Although it is never too
early to maintain infrastructure, the optimum moment
for the government is during the “critical phase” which
occurs at the end of the first stage when roads are still
in good condition. The reason maintenance is not sug-
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To reverse deterioration, maintenance needs to be
done at the beginning of this stage to prevent the accelerated deterioration that occurs after the critical
point in which the basic structure is damaged. Ideally,
intervention takes place before this critical point, because reinforcing the surface is not costly and preserves the original structure. But If maintenance takes
place after the critical point, surface reinforcement is
insufficient to protect the basic structure. In that case
rehabilitation is needed, which is more expensive than
preventive maintenance before the critical point.

Box figure 3.1. Typical road life cycle

Very good
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Road condition

deterioration is imperceptible, maintenance is ignored due to fiscal constraints and more priority is
given to roads where deterioration is worst and most
perceivable Fast deterioration and breaking point:
After several years of deterioration without maintenance, the road starts to deteriorate rapidly. Even at
this stage, deterioration probably cannot be identified because the basic structure is suffering, but it
cannot be seen. Then surface deterioration starts to
show, and at this critical point destruction accelerates and the road passes from regular to poor condition and approaches the end of its service life. This a
short period that takes two to five years.
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projects or waits until tragedies occur to call attention
to deferred maintenance (Jaffe 2015). This bias
against maintenance occurs around the world, but
unfortunately evidence is scarce and difficult to get,
especially for non-developed countries. This hinders
the study of maintenance and strategic decisionmaking. Recently, some US authors have promoted a
campaign to advocate for maintenance. Estimations
for the US suggest that from 2004 to 2008, the state
road system was made up of 99 percent existing
roads and 1 percent new roads. During this period,
43 percent of the road budget went to
maintenance of existing roads, and 57 percent went
to construction of new roads.

Although maintenance is practice of fiscal prudence,
there is a political incentive to defer maintenance
during times of fiscal constraints, which effectively
raises future costs. Classifying maintenance as an
investment
expenditure,
instead
of
current
expenditure, can allow for greater participation in the
budget given that it would not be restricted to fiscal
rules that constrain current expenditures. Moreover,
it can increase the financing sources and ensure the
continuity of maintenance, despite changes in
government or expenditure cuts.
There are some exceptions to the lack of data on
maintenance expenditures. For example, Paraguay
publishes maintenance expenditures in its national
accounts. In December 2016, the government started
a new system in which the company that reconstructs
a route is also responsible for its maintenance.

Moreover, estimates for the United States
indicate that an annual expenditure of $145 billion is
needed to maintain highways and bridges at current
performance levels. Other studies have much higher
estimates, of up to $194 billion (Kahn and Levinson
2011). The American Society for Civil Engineers
estimates that poorly repaired roads in the state of
Massachusetts imposed costs on motorists of about
$2.3 billion, suggesting that the national figure
exceeds $100 billion. Motorists each year pay between
$0.50 and $1 tax on gasoline in extra automobile
repairs because of poorly repaired roads (Summers
2017).

Another country on which there is more information regarding maintenance is Peru. Cusato and Pastor
(2007) identified historic rehabilitation investments
in roads that today are in bad shape due to the lack
of investment in maintenance. They identified roads
that were rehabilitated during the 90s, then followed
the maintenance they received and assessed the
current situation of those roads. This allowed them to
identify the gap in maintenance, but also the cost of
the later rehabilitation, and compare this to the
cost of regular maintenance. They estimate that
between 1992 and 2005, Peru spent seven times
more bringing neglected roads back into full
operation than it would have spent had it provided
regular routine maintenance.

The earlier necessary maintenance is done, the less it
costs. Kahn and Levinson (2011) estimate that in the
United States, every $1 spent on preventive
maintenance saves $4–$10 in future repairs. Heggie
(1995a) estimates that if Africa had invested $12
billion in periodic maintenance of roads during the
1980s, it could have saved $45 billion in rebuilding
and rehabilitation costs in the mid-1990s. He
estimates that poorly maintained roads raised the
cost of repairs by about $14,000 per vehicle (Heggie
1995b).

The World Bank developed the Road Network
Evaluation Tools (RONET) model to help decision
makers in Sub-Saharan Africa make maintenance
investments (Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Policy
Program 2017). It allows them to monitor the
condition
of
roads,
simulate road network
performance under different maintenance and
budget scenarios, and estimate the revenues collected
from road user charges and the gap between them and
the budget. The tool allows leaders to identify the
optimal maintenance standard for each road and
the minimum cost to maintain the current condition
or reach other levels of service. Several maintenance
investments in Africa have been made using this tool.
Its success in improving or increasing maintenance has
not yet been established, however.

In Latin America, the attitude towards maintaining
infrastructure is very limited. There is no systematic
information on how and by how much the region
invests in maintenance and on top there are few
studies evidencing the lack of maintenance. Besides
the
scarce
evidence on maintenance, the
expenditure on maintenance is difficult to track in
the national accounts because it is not limited to a
single account. Furthermore, maintenance is rarely
recognized as an investment expenditure.
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Concluding
Remarks
The policy debate around infrastructure, in multilateral
development banks as well as in countries, tends to
focus on investment needs—that is, how to measure,
build and finance the additional infrastructure
required to promote economic growth or respond to
a growing demand. Much less attention has been
paid to the need to improve the quality of
infrastructure spending. This report argues that LAC
can invest better and can provide more infrastructure
services by making better use of available assets.
How and to what extend can efficiency be im proved?
This report focuses on the main dimensions of the project cycle of infrastructure delivery and concludes that
improving the efficiency of in frastructure de livery—b y
improving
project
selection
and
optimizing
portfolios, reducing cost overruns and delays, and
making the most of existing assets—could have a
sizable impact on infrastructure spending. Our
quantitative
exercises
confirm that potential
efficiency gains could reach 40 per cent of public
infrastructure spending, and identify specific actions
to be implemented. In a region for which there is
widespread consensus that infrastructure investment
is low—and at a level incapable of closing the infrastructure gap required to increase competitiveness
and contribute to improve the quality of life of its
population — the efficiency of infrastructure spending
should be a sensible area for future policy debate
and applied research to focus on.
1. Planning of infrastructure. In the LAC region, there is
significant room for improvement in the early stages of
project planning and selection. The analysis of several
indexes that compare institutional characteristics
allow to divide countries in LAC in four distinctive
groups. The bottom two, which include Costa Rica, El
Salvador, Panama, Paraguay, Guatemala,

Honduras, Nicaragua, and Uruguay, must strengthen their institutions to improve the efficiency of upstream planning.

It has proven very difficult to quantitatively measure gains from better planning. Relying on infrastructure investment data from cites gathered by
the IDB’s ESC program, this report shows that annual savings generated by better planning could
reach around 2.2 percent of annual infrastructure
investment compared to business-as-usual practices, or 0.05 percent of regional GDP.
2. Streamlining infrastructure delivery, by reducing
cost overruns and time delays in project implementation, has the potential to significantly reduce the
required investment in infrastructure. While global
cost overruns average 28 percent of the total cost
of a project, in Latin America they average 48 percent of project costs, and this share has been rising
in recent years. In our sample of multilateral development bank projects in LAC, IDB and World Bank
projects similarly suffered cost overruns, and these
accounted for an average of 17–22 percent of the
total project costs. To calculate potential savings
in infrastructure investment we consider that cost
overruns (of 22 percent) achieved by multilateral
development banks is the most realistic and lowest
possible benchmark countries in LAC can achieve
when they finance infrastructure investments with
their own resources.

Using multilateral development bank projects as
a lower bound at 22 percent, there is potential for
LAC to lower cost overruns by 26 percent, saving
annually above 0.65 percent of regional GDP by
limiting overruns to a technical minimum.

42

Increasing the efficiency of public
infrastructure delivery

Evidence-based potential efficiency gains in public infrastructure spending
in Latin America and the Caribbean

cy of infrastructure service provision. In LAC, there
is room for improvement in the efficiency of current
infrastructure services, from ports and airports to
electricity, water and sewage. We construct a frontier with quality of infrastructure as the output and
public capital stock and income per capita as inputs and find that LAC falls behind other countries
and regions. LAC, on average, barely reaches 10
percent of the infrastructure efficiency of the top
country, Switzerland. On a positive note, the region
has increased efficiency levels by more than 50 percent from 2007 to 2013.

Cost overruns in infrastructure delivery usually get most
of the attention, but time delays can be, when properly accounted for, as important as cost overruns. After
all, time is money. Unfortunately, information on time
delays in infrastructure projects is, to date, not readily
available. No country or institution collects this information, and when it is available it is impossible to produce
cross-country comparisons. Probably the clearest indication of the perennial problem of time delays in infrastructure delivery is budget under-execution.
To study time delays and measure potential efficiency
gains from reducing them we followed a similar approach as with cost overruns. We used IDB projects to
produce a theoretical disbursement curve (the disbursement schedule produced by experts in the field with ample experience in the field and in the LAC region) and
compared actual disbursements against it. While there
is a gap between the theoretical curve and the actual
curve, there has been a learning process, and over time
the actual curve is moving towards the theoretical curve.
However, there is still room for improvement.
Project size, outliers, and different infrastructure subsectors showed no significant difference in disbursement
patterns, and all are behind the theoretical curve. Infrastructure projects show a bigger gap from the theoretical curve than other sectors, such as education and
health. There is no significant difference across countries, and projects in all countries are systematically behind the theoretical curve. However, the gap in Central
American and Caribbean countries is bigger compared
to countries in South America and Mexico.

Our results value the observed delays in disbursements between 2.8 percent and 19.7 percent of
project costs, depending on the interest rate. This
shows that timely implementation can increase efficiency, and if disbursements follow the stipulated
schedule, savings could account for up to 19.7 percent of the total of the project. Since public expenditure on infrastructure reaches 2.5 percent of regional GDP, savings from improving disbursements
could reach up to 0.49 percent of regional GDP.
3.

Making the most of existing assets is a fundamental
pillar in a strategy that seeks to improve the efficien-

Maintenance could be the answer for a better use
of existing assets. We describe optimal maintenance strategies as the least cost option to provide
infrastructure services. Producing sector- and region-wide estimates of cost savings generated by
optimal maintenance strategies proved to be an
impossible task due to the lack of data. As an example for the importance of adequate maintenance,
evidence from Peru shows that the country spent 7
times more bringing neglected roads back into full
operation than it would have spent if those roads
had undergone regular maintenance between 1992
and 2005.

Summing up, LAC countries currently invest about
3.5 percent of their annual GDP in infrastructure,
to which the public sector contributes with 2.5 percent of GDP. The analysis carried out in this report
concludes that efficiency gains can reach 40 percent of public investment in infrastructure, or 1 percent of GDP. History has taught us that increasing
infrastructure investment to the levels required to
close the infrastructure gap has proven to be an
elusive reality. It might be time to change gears,
and convince ourselves that when more investment
is not possible, the priority should first and foremost lie on increasing the efficiency of infrastructure spending, from upstream planning to the appropriate maintenance of available assets.
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Appendix: Countries
included in the
efficiency frontier
analysis
A

Albania
Argentina
Armenia
Australia
Austria
Azerbaijan

B

Bahrain
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belgium
Benin
Bolivia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Botswana
Brazil
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Burundi

C

Cambodia
Cameroon
Canada
Central African Republic
Chad
Chile
China
China
Colombia
Costa Rica
Croatia
Czech Republic
Côte d’Ivoire

D

Denmark
Dominican Republic

E

Ecuador

Egypt
El Salvador
Estonia
Ethiopia

F

Finland
France

G

Gabon
Gambia, The
Georgia
Germany
Ghana
Greece
Guatemala
Guinea

H

Honduras
Hong Kong SAR
Iceland

I

India
Indonesia
Iran
Ireland
Israel
Italy

J

Japan
Jordan

K

Kazakhstan
Kenya
Korea
Kuwait

L

Lebanon

Lesotho
Lithuania
Luxembourg

M

Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Mali
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mexico
Moldova
Mongolia
Montenegro
Morocco
Mozambique

N

Namibia
Nepal
Netherlands
New Zealand
Niger
Nigeria
Norway

O

Oman

P

Pakistan
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal

Q

Qatar

R

Romania
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Russia
Rwanda

S

Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Serbia
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Slovak Republic
South Africa
Spain
Sri Lanka
Swaziland
Sweden
Switzerland

T

Taiwan Province of China
Tajikistan
Tanzania
Thailand
Togo
Trinidad and Tobago
Turkey

U

Uganda
Ukraine
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay

V

Venezuela
Vietnam

Y

Yemen

Z

Zambia
Zimbabwe

